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* Although Judge Lewis took part in consideration of this case, he has 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
On this appeal, we are asked to decide a question offirst 
impression in Pennsylvania: whether an insurer's failure to 
defend under its liability insurance policy, which results in 
a default judgment being entered against its insured, 
entitles a third-party beneficiary of the policy to sue the 
insurer to collect the judgment when the policy only 
permits such suits after an "actual trial." In this case, 
plaintiff, Ronald Apalucci, obtained a default judgment 
against C.R. Management Enterprises, Inc. t/a Tijuana 
Yacht Club (the "Tijuana Yacht Club" or the "Club"). The 
Club's insurer, defendant, Agora Syndicate, Inc. ("Agora"), 
failed to defend the lawsuit. Apalucci then sought payment 
of the judgment from Agora as a third-party beneficiary 
under Agora's liquor liability insurance policy with the 
Tijuana Yacht Club. When Apalucci's efforts to collect 
failed, he sued Agora alleging bad faith and breach of 
contract in refusing to defend the Club and make payment 
to him. The district court granted Agora's motion for 
summary judgment. Apalucci timely appealed. We will 




Because this appeal is from a grant of summary 
judgment, the following facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the appellant, Apalucci, with all doubts and 
reasonable inferences resolved in his favor. See Reitz v. 
County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
underlying suit at issue here arises from the Tijuana Yacht 
Club's service of alcoholic beverages to Apalucci when he 
was only 19 years old and visibly intoxicated. After leaving 
the Club, he fell into a plate glass window and sustained 
serious injuries to his leg. 
 
Apalucci then sued the Club in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging, 
among other things, that it was negligent in serving 
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alcoholic beverages to him in light of his minority age and 
visible intoxication. Shortly after the incident, however, the 
Club ceased to do business and its principal, Cam Rowell, 
could not be found. Thus, unable to personally serve 
Rowell, Apalucci eventually effectuated substitute service by 
mail. When the Club took no action in response to 
Apalucci's complaint, the court entered a default judgment 
against it for $75,000. 
 
At the time of Apalucci's injury, the Tijuana Yacht Club 
carried a liquor liability insurance policy issued by Agora. 
Apalucci attempted to collect his judgment by making a 
demand against Agora for payment of the $75,000 default 
judgment in accordance with the terms of the policy. As a 
condition of coverage, however, the policy required the 
Club's owner to notify it, and cooperate and assist in the 
investigation and defense, of any claims. Furthermore, the 
policy permitted suit against Agora only on a final judgment 
obtained after an "actual trial." Although Rowell notified 
Agora of Apalucci's claim, Agora alleges that it was unable 
to locate Rowell. Accordingly, Agora denied coverage due to 
Rowell's failure to cooperate and assist in the defense of 
Apalucci's claims as required by the terms of the insurance 
contract. Apalucci contests this allegation, arguing that the 
insured cooperated in the investigation of the claim and 
that Agora even undertook an initial investigation into the 
facts surrounding the incident. 
 
In his complaint, Apalucci raised two claims. First, he 
alleged that Agora acted in bad faith in the execution of its 
duty to provide coverage and defense to the Club. Second, 
he alleged that Agora's failure to pay the $75,000 judgment 
constituted "a breach of contractual duties owed to [him] as 
a third party beneficiary of the coverage purchased by [the 
Tijuana Yacht Club]." 
 
Agora denied any obligation to Apalucci and moved for 
summary judgment. In its motion, Agora asserted as its 
primary defense Apalucci's lack of standing to sue for bad 
faith, and secondarily, the Club's failure to cooperate in the 
underlying negligence action. These defenses, it forcefully 
argued, relieved it of any duties it may have had to the 
Club or Apalucci. Persuaded, the district court granted 
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summary judgment in favor of Agora. After the court denied 




Although the parties discuss at length their differing 
versions of the facts, and their respective views as to the 
court's grant of summary judgment, the dispositive issues 
raised concern the right to sue under the insurance 
contract and the contract's "no action clause." These 
related issues are solely legal over which our review is 
plenary. See Travitz v. Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health and 
Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 708 (3d Cir. 1994); McMillan v. 
State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America, 922 F.2d 1073, 
1074 (3d Cir. 1990). Specifically, we must predict whether 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that Agora's 
failure to defend the Club against Apalucci's suit, resulting 
in a default judgment against it, entitles Apalucci, as third- 
party beneficiary under the liability insurance policy, to sue 
Agora to collect on the judgment when the policy only 
permits such suit after an "actual trial." 
 
It is well-settled that under Pennsylvania law, an injured 
party has no right to directly sue the insurer of an alleged 
tortfeasor unless a provision of the policy or a statute 
create such a right. See, e.g., Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat'l 
Mut. Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), 
rev'd on other grounds, 554 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1989); Folmar v. 
Shaffer, 332 A.2d 821, 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974); 
Philadelphia Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 
222 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). Apalucci, 
however, argues that the district court ignored the very 
clear terms of Agora's insurance policy which contains an 
express provision obligating it to pay the judgment he 
obtained against its insured, thus breaching its contractual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1332, as the parties are citizens of different states and the 
amount in controversy exceeded the then-applicable amount of $50,000. 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of the district court's final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law applies. The district court 
applied Pennsylvania law, as do we. 
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obligation to him as a third-party beneficiary.2 As Apalucci 
correctly notes, the district court did not determine the 
meaning of, or even mention, this provision. 
 
The specific provision on which Apalucci focuses is 
commonly referred to as a "No Action Clause." It reads in 
relevant part as follows: 
 
       No person or organization has a right . . . : 
 
       a. To join us as a party or otherwise bring us into a 
          "suit" asking for damages from an insured; or 
 
       b. To sue us . . . unless all . . . terms have been fully 
          complied with. 
 
       A person or organization may sue us to recover on an 
       agreed settlement or on a final judgment against an 
       insured obtained after an actual trial . . .. 
 
(emphasis added). Thus, under this provision, an insured 
must meet two conditions precedent to have a direct right 
of action against the insurer. First, the insured must have 
fully complied with all terms of the policy, including the 
previously mentioned notice and cooperation provisions. We 
express no opinion as to whether this condition was met as 
the district court did not address the issue and decided the 
case on other grounds. This issue will need to be resolved 
on remand. Construing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Apalucci, we will assume solely for purposes of 
this discussion that the condition has been met. 
 
Second, Apalucci must have obtained a final judgment in 
his favor against the Club after an "actual trial." Agora 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Apalucci also argues for the first time here on appeal that Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 40, S 117 provides him with a statutory right to proceed against 
Agora. Under this provision, "the insolvency or bankruptcy of the person 
insured shall not release the insurance carrier from the payment of 
damages for injury sustained or loss occasioned during the life of such 
policy." As a general rule, however, " `[t]his [C]ourt has consistently 
held 
that it will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal.' " Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 
443 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 
845 (3d Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1385 (1998). Accordingly, we 
decline to address the merits of this argument. 
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contends that because Apalucci obtained only a default 
judgment against its insured and thus an actual trial was 
never held, Apalucci has no standing to sue it under the 
express terms of this provision. We disagree. We conclude 
that in the context of this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that other factors outweigh the policy's 
actual trial requirement and entitle Apalucci to sue Agora. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Circuit sitting 
in diversity have not had the occasion to interpret a "no 
action clause" in the context of a direct action by a third- 
party who secured a default judgment against an insured 
due to the insurer's alleged failure to defend. Several 
Pennsylvania cases, however, do provide support for the 
result we reach today. First, in Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine 
and Inland Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 928 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993), 
aff 'd, 636 A.2d 627 (Pa. 1994), the court, in discussing an 
almost identical no action clause, explained the clause's 
purposes as follows: 
 
       [N]o action clauses are intended to prevent (1) actions 
       against the insurer for a money judgment by the 
       injured party until damages have been fixed by final 
       judgment or agreed settlement; (2) nuisance suits 
       against the insurance company; and (3) an injured 
       party or an insured from bringing the insurance 
       company into the underlying litigation with possible 
       resultant prejudice. 
 
Id. at 930 (citations omitted). None of these purposes is 
offended by permitting Apalucci's suit against Agora after 
obtaining a default judgment. The fact and the amount of 
the insured's liability have been conclusively established by 
an enforceable court judgment. Moreover, Apalucci's suit is 
not a nuisance suit. Thus, when the clause is distilled, its 
essence is not the nature of the trial but whether the 
insured suffered a bona fide and fixed money judgment. 
 
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977), 
provides further support for our analysis of the no action 
clause and the legal significance of the term"actual trial" 
contained therein. In Brakeman, an insurer defended 
against a suit brought by a party injured in an accident 
involving its insured. The action sought payment of a 
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settlement agreement entered into by the injured party and 
its insured, on the grounds that the insured breached a 
term of the contract. The late, learned Justice Roberts, 
citing a long line of cases, noted that (as allegedly happened 
here), "[w]here an insurance carrier breaches its insurance 
contract by unjustifiably refusing to defend its insured, it 
cannot assert as a defense to an action by the insured or 
the injured party that the insured did not comply with the 
`actual trial' provisions of the insurance contract." Id. at 
200-201 (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations 
omitted). He went on to explain that, "[t]he insurance 
company's initial repudiation of the contract in denying 
liability under the policy relieve[s] the insured of strict 
performance of those provisions intended for the protection 
of the insurer [if the insurer is in fact obligated to defend 
the insured]." Id. at 201 (quoting Murphy & Co. v. 
Manufacturers' Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. 281, 286 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1926)); see also Roberts v. Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, 
N.J., 101 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1954) (quoting Murphy & Co. with 
approval). This language demonstrates that the applicability 
of the "actual trial" provision is dependent upon the insurer 
defending its insured in good faith. This is precisely what 
Apalucci argues Agora did not do. 
 
Accordingly, because the insurer's refusal to defend " `cut 
at the very root of the mutual obligation, [it] put an end to 
its right to demand further compliance with the . . . term 
of the contract.' " Id. (quoting St. Louis Dressed Beef & 
Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173, 181 
(1906)). Thus, we predict that if confronted with this 
question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude 
that if Agora's refusal to defend its insured amounted to a 
breach of the insurance contract and resulted in the default 
judgment obtained by Apalucci, Agora thereby forfeited its 
right to enforce the actual trial requirement. Therefore, we 
hold that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not 
preclude Apalucci from suing Agora for breach of contract 
pursuant to the policy's no action clause, despite the 
absence of an actual trial.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Apalucci has not raised the issue of whether Agora's failure to defend 
constitutes a waiver and/or estoppel, and we, therefore, do not discuss 
it. 
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Finally, the result we reach comports with elementary 
principles of fairness and equity. As a general rule, when 
one party to a contract unilaterally prevents the 
performance of a condition upon which his own liability 
depends, the culpable party may not then capitalize on that 
failure. See, e.g., St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co., 
201 U.S. at 181; Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Sur. Co. 
of N.Y., 175 A. 536, 537 (Pa. 1934). Here, it strikes us as 
patently unfair to allow Agora to unilaterally (and 
potentially unjustifiably) sit by while a default judgment is 
entered against its insured, and then take advantage of 
that same self-induced default as the cornerstone on which 
to reject a claim under the insurance contract between 





In summary, we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that an insurance company's failure to 
defend its insured, which results in the entry of a default 
judgment against the insured, entitles a third-party 
beneficiary of a liability insurance policy to directly sue the 
insurer to collect and enforce the default judgment, 
notwithstanding that the policy only permits a third-party 
suit to collect if a judgment is obtained in an "actual trial." 
We remind the parties, however, that we express no opinion 
as to the factual merits of this case. We leave the factual 
issues, such as the insured's alleged cooperation with 
Agora, for resolution on remand in the district court. 
 
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment will be reversed and the case remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. Costs taxed against the appellee. 
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